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 Introduction 
The effectiveness of Crew Resource Management (CRM) programs has been evaluated 
previously (O’Connor, Jones, McCauley, & Buttrey, 2012), citing (in part) a lack of evidence to 
support the view that CRM training is having a clear effect on the mishap rate.  One example that 
raises such questions and concerns is the fatal accident of Crossair flight 3579, which involved a 
highly experienced airline crew that was assessed and deemed capable of performing its duty 
only one month before the occurrence of the accident (Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, 
[AAIB], 2001).   
These findings are consistent with other research results (e.g., Salas, Wilson, Burke, & 
Wightman, 2006).  One of the specific problems in this is how ergonomics, (both researchers and 
practitioners), can determine whether the behavioral categories typically used in CRM training 
and assessment are linked to actual safety-critical behavior in cockpits.  Furthermore, it needs to 
be questioned whether the very use of such categories itself influences or even determines 
examiners' construction of what occurs in that cockpit.   
A better understanding of airline pilot performance assessment is the subject of ongoing 
research (e.g., Brannick, Prince, & Salas, 2002; Deaton et al., 2007; Dismukes, McDonnell, & 
Jobe, 2009; Holt, Hansberger, & Boehm-Davis, 2002; Mavin & Roth, 2014; Mulqueen, Baker, & 
Dismukes, 2002; Salas, Bowers, & Prince, 1998; Thomas, 2004).  Various models are described 
in the literature to assess the performance of airline pilots.  Some examples are the use of 
behavioral markers (Helmreich & Foushee, 1993), Line Operational Evaluations (LOE) (e.g., 
Goldsmith & Johnson, 2002; Hamman & Holt, 1997), NOTECHS (Flin et al., 2003; O’Connor et 
al., 2002), or the Model for Assessing a Pilot’s Performance (MAPP) (Mavin & Roth, 2014).  
However, the use of models is hardly standardized among airlines (Mavin, Roth, & Dekker, 
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 2013), particularly for the assessment of pilots’ non-technical skills (i.e., situation awareness, 
communication).   
The development of assessment models and grade sheets has proven difficult (Goldsmith 
& Johnson, 2002).  Large efforts have been made to categorize the variety of crew behavior into 
a fine set of behavioral markers (e.g., Dutra, Norman, Malone, McDougall, & Edens, 1995; Flin 
& Martin, 2001).  Yet doubt has been expressed about breaking complex performance into 
smaller, measurable components (Mavin & Dall’Alba, 2011; Mavin & Roth, 2014).   
It is a common trend to measure the value of an assessment model in terms of its (inter-
rater) reliability and validity measures, which build on assessment scores of various independent 
raters (e.g., Hamman & Holt, 1997; Holt, Johnson, & Goldsmith, 1997; O’Connor et al., 2002).  
However, studies have revealed large variance and low inter-rater reliability in the scoring of 
pilot performance (i.e., Mavin et al., 2013; Roth & Mavin, 2013; Roth, Mavin, & Munro, 2014).  
Pursuing the goal of agreement across raters, several strategies are widely used to reduce such 
rater disagreement (Baker & Dismukes, 2002; Bernardin & Buckley, 1981; Goldsmith & 
Johnson, 2002; Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994).  These strategies aspire to increase assessors’ 
observational skills (behavioral-observation training), to teach assessors to avoid commonly 
made mistakes (rater-error training), to familiarize raters with the assessment scale 
(performance-dimension training), and to instruct raters on performance assessment according to 
a standard set by experts (frame-of-reference training).  Hence, efforts to increase raters’ 
agreement largely focus on the assessors themselves.   
In contrast, the constructs, concepts, and categories underlying assessment models and 
human factors are hardly questioned any longer (e.g., Dekker, Nyce, van Winsen, & Henriqson, 
2010).  The literature lacks an investigation into the consequences of using a model in the 
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 assessment of complex pilot performance.  It remains unclear whether the use of a model has an 
influence on the raters’ scoring in the assessment process.  The scores of raters who use a model 
have not yet been contrasted with the scores of raters who assessed performance without a 
model.  The need of the present study is reflected in this lack of statistical examinations into the 
scoring of performance in the airline aviation industry and research.   
The aim of this study was to draw a comparison of assessment scores provided by raters 
from two different airlines when judging the performance of peers (captain and first officer) in 
multiple video-scenarios.  Assessors judged pilot performance in pairs of equal rank (first 
officers, captains, and flight examiners).  One participating airline used an assessment model, 
whereas the other one was not given a model.  In the light of this contrast, we examined 
differences in the scoring of assessors-pairs.  Further exploratory examinations were conducted, 
pertaining, for example, to assessors’ critical observation that passengers may have been 
evacuated from the aircraft to the side of a spinning engine.   
Methods 
Participants 
The present study involved two airlines, Airline A and Airline B, which both conduct 
passenger flights in the Southern hemisphere on the ATR-72 and Dash-8 aircraft, respectively.  
The data collection of Airline A preceded the data collection of Airline B.  In total, N = 36 
airline pilots (subsequently referred to as assessor/s, assessor-pilot/s, or [assessor] pair/s) 
participated, n = 18 of each airline: 6 first officers, 6 captains, and 6 flight examiners.  All 
assessors held a current license and operated the respective aircraft according to the rank they 
held when they participated in the present study.  Participants were randomly chosen among 
those with free slots during the one-week data collection period of each airline.  Separately for 
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 Airline A and B, the assessors were randomly grouped into pairs of equal rank: first officer pairs 
(subsequently referred to as FO), captain pairs (CAP), and flight examiner pairs (FE).  In total, 
there were 9 pairs per airline and 3 pairs per rank.  The demographics of the participating 
assessors (age, total flight hours, and years as commercial pilot) are outlined in the Results 
section (see Demographics of the assessors; Table 5; Figure 4).  The reason to conduct 
assessments in pairs is mirrored in the encouragement of producing oral assessment protocols, 
which have been deemed more natural than the use of think-aloud protocols by individual 
assessors (e.g. Ericsson & Simon, 1993).   
Design 
The analysis involved an observational 2 x 2 x 3 x 3 between groups four factorial 
design.  The independent variables (subsequently referred to as IV) were Airline, Pilot assessed, 
Rank, and Scenario (variables are italicized and first letter capitalized throughout the present 
study).  There were two levels of the IV Airline: Airline A, Airline B (nominal level of 
measurement); two levels of Pilot assessed: captain, first officer (nominal); three levels of Rank: 
FO, CAP, FE (treated ordinal, because the FO were deemed the least experienced, whereas the 
FE the most experienced assessors); and three levels of Scenario: Scenario 1, Scenario 2, 
Scenario 3 (nominal).   
Two additional variables were added in the course of the analysis: the IV Groups and the 
dependent variable (DV) Spinning engine.  Groups, on the one hand, was necessary to draw a 
comparison of the scores provided to each pilot assessed and scenario by the raters of the two 
airlines.  It was derived from the variables Airline, Pilot assessed, and Scenario.  There were 
twelve levels of Groups (nominal): A1-F1 and A2-F2 (Table 3).  Spinning engine, on the other 
hand, allowed us to analyze whether the assessor-pairs noticed that the engine was still spinning 
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 when the pilot crew evacuated the passengers to this side in Scenario 3.  The Spinning engine 
was dichotomous: noticed, not noticed (nominal).   
The DV Scores were treated as a continuous (interval) because it represents a Likert-type 
scale, assuming equal distances on each item (i.e., Norman, 2010; van Alphen, Halfens, Hasman, 
& Imbos, 1994).  The scores were ranked as follows: 1 (unsatisfactory performance), 2 
(minimum standard), 3 (satisfactory), 4 (good standard), and 5 (very good standard).  This type 
of scoring represents the assessment scale both participating airlines use to assess the 
performance of their pilots.  The analysis involved a total of 108 assessment scores: 2 airlines x 9 
pairs x 3 scenarios x 2 pilots assessed.   
The IV Airline involved a confound that could not be entirely removed.  One group of 
assessors was given an assessment model and instructed how to use it, whereas the other group 
was not.  Hence, the distinguishing factor between the treatments of the two groups was the 
airline.  Strictly speaking, the resulting confound prevented to determine whether significant 
differences were due to the model used or the airline involved.  In other words, differences in 
raters’ scoring could either have resulted from the fact that the two airlines were involved in this 
research or that one airline used an assessment model to judge performance whereas the other 
did not.  The results thus have to be interpreted with care.  However, this confound was partly 
controlled by distinguishing between different ranks of assessors.  Furthermore, all participating 
flight examiners were licensed and authorized by both their airline and the regulator to determine 
the level of pilots’ performance and make decisions that may affect career options.   
This authorization is independent of the model (or other assessment tools) applied, the 
training received, or the airline involved.  Furthermore, the experience of the assessor-pilots of 
Airline A and B were equated and controlled by comparing the demographics (age, total flight 
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 hours, years as commercial pilot) overall and in regards to specific ranks (see Demographics of 
the assessors).   
Scenarios 
Each pair assessed three videotaped scenarios, showing the performance of a captain and 
first officer flying as a crew in a certified full-motion flight simulator (abbreviations were only 
used to refer to the assessor pairs [FO, CAP, FE], yet not to refer to the pilots [captain and first 
officer] assessed in the scenarios).  Both pilots in the scenarios wore company uniforms.  Other 
employees assumed roles as the cabin crew and ATC controllers.   
All scenarios were scripted in advance and recorded with three cameras from the position 
of the flight examiner (seated behind the pilots).  The first camera captured the pilots from 
behind; the second and third cameras provided pertinent close-up pictures of relevant instrument 
displays.  At several stages during the scenarios, relevant charts (such as approach plates) were 
superimposed.   
In Scenario 1 (subsequently referred to as S1), a captain (pilot flying) and first officer 
conducted an instrument approach at daytime.  Close to the airport, they became visual with the 
runway and initiated a circling approach to land against the wind from the opposite direction.  
During base turn, the aircraft encountered a rain cloud, which required the crew to conduct a 
missed approach.  The captain initially turned the wrong way.  However, he was immediately 
corrected by the first officer.   
Scenario 2 (S2) showed a captain and first officer (pilot flying) performing an instrument 
approach by day.  Poor weather hampered visual contact with the runway, which forced the crew 
to conduct a missed approach.  Despite the low fuel status, the captain attempted to convince the 
first officer to try a second approach at the destination airport and only divert to the alternate 
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 airport in case they would fail to land.  The first officer was reluctant and expressed his intention 
to directly divert to the alternate airport.   
In Scenario 3 (S3), a captain (pilot flying) and first officer conducted an approach to an 
airport during daylight.  When the aircraft was already configured for landing (landing gear 
down, flaps set), the left engine caught fire.  Both crew members followed their procedures to 
extinguish the fire and continued on the approach.  Seconds before touching down on the 
runway, the first officer informed the cabin crew about the present situation.  The captain landed 
the aircraft and ordered the passengers to evacuate on the runway after having received clearance 
from the tower controller.   
 The footage of the scenarios presented to the pairs of Airline A and B slightly differed.  
Whereas S3 was identical for the pairs of both airlines (aircraft: Dash-8; duration: 9.16 min), S1 
and S2 of Airline B were reproductions of the respective scenarios of Airline A.  The reason was 
that all assessors had to be familiar with the aircraft, cockpit, environment, airports, and 
approaches shown in the scenarios.  Consequently, S1 of Airline A was filmed in an ATR-72 
simulator (duration: 6.45 min), whereas its reproduction of Airline B was filmed in a Dash-8 
simulator (7.54 min).  The same applied to S2 (Airline A: ATR-72, 3.30 min; Airline B: Dash-8, 
3.46 min).  However, before and during the filming of the reproduced scenarios, the original 
footage was presented to the acting crew.  The takes were repeated until the scenarios were 
highly similar in terms of their content, action plot, pilot performance, and conversation.  The 
duration of the original and reproduced S1 differed by 69 seconds, whereas S2 by 16 seconds.  
This variation was unavoidable due to the different approach procedures of the destination 
airports in the scenarios.  The authors are aware of the less than optimal footage presented to the 
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 assessors.  However, the high similarity of the original and reproduced scenarios justifies a 
comparison of the scoring between the assessors of Airline A and B.   
Procedure 
The study setting (Figure 1) was identical for both airlines.  Each assessor pair 
(comprised of Assessor 1 and Assessor 2) was seated at a table in front of a large LCD TV 
screen, which they controlled via a computer with a mouse.  The pairs were asked to keep all 
sheets in the designated area of work, which was recorded from above with a camera (CAM).  
CAM3 recorded the notes taken, the scores provided on the assessment sheets, assessors’ 
pointing gestures, etc.  CAM1 captured the assessors and the area of work, whereas CAM2 
provided a closer view of the assessors.   
 
Figure 1. Study setting.   
 
The only difference between the data collection of the two airlines was the written 
material provided to the pairs of Airline A and B during the assessment.  The pilot pairs of 
Airline A were given two sheets from their company’s training manual: the model used by 
Airline A to assess their pilots, and an assessment form (Table 1) derived from the model.  The 
assessor pairs only received one sheet for each pilot assessed (one for the captain and one for the 
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 first officer).  The assessment form provided detailed descriptions of performance for each of the 
scores (1 through 5) and assessment categories (‘Situation awareness,’ ‘Decision making,’ 
‘Aircraft flown within tolerances,’ ‘Knowledge,’ ‘Management,’ and ‘Communication’) of the 
model.  In accordance with the literature (e.g., Mavin & Dall’Alba, 2011; Mavin & Roth, 2014; 
Mavin et al., 2013; Roth et al., 2014), the descriptions of aspects of performance were referred to 
as ‘word pictures’.   
 Table 1 
 Excerpt of the Assessment Form, Including the Word Pictures of the Category 
‘Management’ 
 Scores 
 1 2 3 4 5 
MN 
 Workload 
 
 Control 
 
 Cooperation 
 
 Threats & 
Errors 
 Ineffective 
organisation 
of crew 
tasks. 
 
 Inability to 
control self 
or crew 
member 
performance. 
 
 Interaction 
was 
negligible, 
or disrupted 
team 
effectiveness. 
 
 Serious 
threats or 
errors not 
mitigated or 
managed. 
 Inefficient 
organisation 
of crew tasks. 
 
 Controlled 
self or crew 
member 
actions, 
though with 
difficulty. 
 
 Interacted 
with crew 
member, but 
provided 
limited 
support. 
 
 Threats or 
errors not 
well 
mitigated or 
managed. 
 Adequate 
organisation 
of crew 
tasks. 
 
 Controlled 
self or crew 
members 
performance; 
disagreements 
resolved. 
 
 Interacted 
with crew 
member. 
 
 Most threats 
managed; 
most errors 
trapped. 
 Crew 
member 
tasks 
effectively 
organized. 
 
 Effective 
control of 
self or crew 
to achieve 
expected 
performance. 
 
 Considered 
other crew 
to improve 
team 
performance. 
 
 Threats 
identified 
and 
managed; 
errors 
trapped. 
 Tasks 
organised so 
challenging 
aspects of 
flight 
appeared 
easy. 
 
 Effective 
control of self 
or crew, even 
in 
challenging 
situation. 
 
 Interaction 
with and 
consideration 
of crew 
maximized 
performance. 
 
 TEM well 
integrated. 
Note. MN=Management, 1-5 = assessment scores (1 = very poor performance, 5 = very 
good performance).   
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 In contrast, the pairs of Airline B were only given one assessment-sheet per scenario, 
which neither provided word pictures nor categories.  It only listed the scores (1 through 5), 
separately for each pilot assessed, together with the identical descriptions of the scores that were 
used in the study of Airline A.  All assessors of both airlines were given blank sheets to take as 
many notes as they wanted.  Whereas participants of Airline B did not receive assessment 
training from the researchers (in addition to assessment training within their organization), 
assessors of Airline A were familiarized with the assessment model and form prior to 
participating in this study.  The researchers provided PowerPoint presentations and discussion 
sessions to introduce all Airline A assessors (including first officers, captains, and flight 
examiners) to the model and assessment form in the course of the pilots’ CRM training.  Every 
pilot had used the model and assessment form to judge the performance of peers in at least three 
video scenarios other than the ones assessed in the present study.  Results were compared and 
discussed.  All assessors of Airline A thus had been exposed to the model, assessment form, and 
theoretical concepts (e.g. Situation awareness, Decision making) to a highly similar extent.   
All pairs were given the same task: to watch, discuss, and assess the performance of the 
captain and first officer in each scenario.  To encourage the verbalization of their reasoning, all 
participants assessed performance in pairs.  All participants were informed that the aim of the 
study was to better understand the reasoning behind the assessment of pilot performance.   
The pairs of both airlines were free to pause, replay, or go back in the video scenarios at 
any time and as often as they wanted.  The decision of where to start their discussion and how to 
assess performance was left entirely to the assessors.  Two researchers attended the assessment 
sessions.  Following a fixed protocol, they only intervened when it was necessary to encourage 
participants to speak louder, to clarify a comment, or to provide assessment scores.   
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 To motivate the raters express their thoughts, each pair of assessors only received one 
scoring sheet for each pilot assessed.  This required each pair to come to an agreement about the 
score for each pilot (pairs were allowed to provide semi-scores, e.g. 4.5, if they could not come 
to an agreement).  After their discussion, the pairs of Airline B circled one score for the captain 
and one score for the first officer.  In contrast, the pairs of Airline A assessed one category 
(‘Situation Awareness,’ ‘Decision making,’ etc.) after the other.  They circled specific word 
pictures on the assessment form and eventually decided about the pilot’s score for each category.  
To draw a comparison between the scoring of the two airlines, we calculated an average overall 
score for each pilot and scenario assessed by the pairs of Airline A: the sum of the scores for 
each category, divided by the number of categories (6).   
Data Analysis 
After the data collection, a picture-in-picture video was created for each of the 18 
assessment sessions, including the footage of all three cameras.  The pairs’ scores were collected 
in an Excel spreadsheet, separately for each scenario, pilot assessed, and airline.  In the course of 
the assessment sessions, all N = 36 participants were asked about their demographics: Age (in 
years; interval), Total flight hours (interval), and Years as commercial pilot (CPL; interval).  All 
variables involved in the analysis were derived from the videos, scores, and/or demographics.  
The data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software, 
Version 22.  The data was manually entered and verified before the below specified statistical 
procedures and tests were performed.   
Rather than applying multivariate procedures, we calculated univariate analyses due to 
the following reasons: first, the demographic variables pertained to individual assessors, whereas 
the scores related to the assessor pairs.  We analyzed the age, total flight hours, and years flown 
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 as commercial pilot separately from the analysis of the scores (see Demographics of the 
assessors).  Second, the issue of the spinning engine only related to S3.  We conducted a separate 
analysis of the spinning engine (see The spinning engine in Scenario 3).  Third, we looked into 
the pass-fail rating independently of the scores because the former was partly derived from the 
latter (see Pass-fail rating).   
Results 
In the following, we present our findings in regards to the scores provided by the pairs of 
the two airlines (see Analysis of the scores).  Subsequently, we outline further relevant and 
interesting findings (see Further exploratory analyses).   
The authors are aware of the problem related to the small sample size and the relatively 
large number of tests employed in this study, which increased the likelihood of spuriously 
significant results.  However, throughout the entire analysis, all p-values of post hoc contrasts 
were adjusted/corrected for multiple comparisons according to Bonferroni.  If not stated 
otherwise, an alpha level of 5% and two-directional hypotheses/p-values were used.   
Analysis of the Scores 
Each assessor pair provided a score for the captain and the first officer assessed in each 
scenario (Table 2).  The scores of Airline B assessor pairs were always equal or lower than those 
of Airline A.  Only one of the CAP pairs of Airline B assessed the first officer in S1 with a 
higher score than the pairs of Airline A.  However, except for the first officer assessed by the FE 
pairs in S2, there were always pairs of Airline B that provided the same scores as some of the 
pairs of Airline A.   
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 Table 2 
Scores Provided by the Assessor Pairs of Airline A and B to the Captain and First Officer 
Assessed in the Scenarios  
  Airline A  Airline B 
Scenario Assessor pair Captain First officer  Captain First officer 
S1 FO 3, 4 4  2, 3 3, 4 
 CAP 2, 3 4  1, 2 2, 4, 5 
 FE 2, 3 3, 4  1, 2 1, 2, 3 
S2 FO 4 3, 5  3, 4 2, 4, 5 
 CAP 2, 3, 4 4, 5  1, 2 1, 3, 4 
 FE 3, 4 4, 5  1, 2, 3 1, 3 
S3 FO 4, 5 4, 5  2, 4 2, 4 
 CAP 3, 5 4, 5   1, 4, 5 1, 4, 5 
 FE 2, 3, 4 2, 3, 4   1, 2 1, 2 
Note. S1 = Scenario 1, S2 = Scenario 2, S3 = Scenario 3, FO = First officer assessor (pair), 
CAP = Captain assessor (pair), FE = Flight examiner assessor (pair), Captain/First officer = 
Pilots assessed.   
 
The mean scores are shown in Figure 2, separately for each pilot assessed, airline, 
scenario, and the pairs’ rank.  The mean scores of the Airline B pairs were always lower than 
Airline A, which applies to both pilots assessed.  On average, all pairs scored the first officer 
higher than the captain in S1 and S2.  In S3, the captain and first officer received identical mean 
scores, except for the FO pairs of Airline A that scored the captain slightly higher (score 4.67) 
than the first officer (score 4.33).   
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Figure 2. Mean scores provided to the captain and first officer assessed in each scenario by the 
assessor pairs of different rank and airline.   
 
The aim of the present effort was to examine whether there is more agreement in terms of 
the scores if raters use an assessment model in the evaluation of pilot performance.  Given that 
Airline A used a model whereas Airline B did not, we drew a comparison of the pairs’ scoring 
between the two airlines (the authors are aware of the limitations to this approach, which will be 
addressed in the discussion).  However, such a comparison is only valid when comparing the 
scores that the pairs of each airline provided to each pilot assessed and scenario.  This, in turn, 
required a distinction between six groups (Table 3): A1/A2, B1/B2, C1/C2, D1/D2, E1/E2, and 
F1/F2.  ‘Group 1’ (A1-F1) related to Airline A, whereas ‘Group 2’ (A2-F2) to Airline B.   
Table 3 
Dispersion Measures of the Scores of Each Group 
  Airline A   Airline B 
  Captain First officer  Captain First officer 
S1 A1: 2.89; 0.601; 2  D1: 3.89; 0.333; 1  A2: 1.89; 0.601; 2 D2: 3.00; 1.225; 4 
S2 B1: 3.44; 0.726; 2 E1: 4.44; 0.726; 2  B2: 2.33; 1.000; 3 E2: 2.89; 1.364; 4 
S3 C1: 4.00; 1.118; 3 F1: 3.89; 0.928; 3   C2: 2.67; 1.581; 4 F2: 2.67; 1.581; 4 
Note. Group (e.g. A1): Mean (e.g. 2.89); SD (e.g. 0.601); Range (e.g. 2); S = Scenario.   
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 An answer to the question about whether there is more agreement in terms of the scoring 
if assessors use a model could not be found by simply comparing the mean scores of the two 
airlines, because the scores related to three different scenarios and involved a captain and a first 
officer being assessed.  Rather, the pairs’ agreement in terms of the scores is reflected in the 
groups’ dispersion measures (standard deviation [SD] and range of the scores) between each two 
groups (e.g. A1/A2).  We thus compared the dispersion measures of each two groups (Table 3).   
Each group’s mean, SD, and range was based on the 9 scores that the 9 pairs (3 FO, 3 
CAP, 3 FE) of the respective airline provided to each pilot assessed in each scenario.  For 
instance, the value 2.89 (Table 3) reflects group A1’s mean of the 9 scores provided to the 
captain assessed in S1 by the three FO, three CAP, and three FE pairs of Airline A.   
 First, we compared the SD of each two groups.  We tested the hypothesis (H1, one-tailed) 
that the mean SD of the scores is greater for the groups of Airline B (A2 to F2) than for Airline 
A (A1 to F1), because the assessor pairs of Airline B were not given an assessment model (H0: 
ΜAirline A  = ΜAirline B; H1: ΜAirline A  < ΜAirline B).  A paired-samples t-test (comparing each two 
groups) showed that the mean SD of the scores of Airline B (M = 1.23, SD = 0.38) was 
significantly higher than those of Airline A (M = 0. 74, SD = .27), t(5) = -3.78, p = .007 (one-
tailed), d = -1.54, 95 CI [-.82, -.16].   
 A (non-parametric) sign-test (H0: p = 0.5; H1: p ≠ 0.5) fortified the result of the t-test: The 
SD of each two groups’ scores were unequal between Airline A and B, p = .032 (one-tailed), 
with 0 negative differences (SD of Airline B-groups < SD Airline A), 5 positive differences (SD 
Airline B > SD Airline A), and 1 tie (SD Airline B = SD Airline A; which was the case for the 
groups A1/A2; Table 3).   
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  Second, we tested the same hypothesis but in terms of the ranges of each two groups.  
The results of a paired-samples t-test showed that the mean range of the scores of the Airline B-
groups (M = 3.50, SD = .837) were significantly higher than Airline A (M = 2.17, SD = .75), t(5) 
= -3.16, p = .013 (one-tailed), d = -1.29, 95 CI [-2.42, -.24].   
A sign-test (testing the same hypothesis as above) showed the same result: the ranges of 
the scores were unequal for the groups of Airline A and B, p = .032 (one-tailed), with 0 negative 
differences (ranges of Airline B-groups < Airline A), 5 positive differences (ranges of Airline B 
> A), and 1 tie (ranges Airline B = A, which was the case for the groups A1/A2; Table 3).   
 The analysis of the dispersion measures revealed highly consistent results, even when 
using different measures (SD, range) and tests (parametric, non-parametric).  The SD and ranges 
of the scores were different for the groups of the two airlines and greater for Airline B than for 
Airline A.  Consequently, there was a smaller spread of the scores in Airline A.  The results 
indicate that there is more agreement in terms of the scoring among pairs of Airline A, who used 
a model to judge pilots’ performance.   
In contrast to comparing the groups’ dispersion measures, we further examined whether 
the groups of the two airlines (Table 3) significantly differ in terms of their actual scoring.  
Applying an independent samples t-test, the means of the scores of each two groups were 
compared (A1/A2, B1/B2 etc.; n = 9 per group).  A t statistic not assuming homogeneity of 
variances was used when homogeneity of variances between the groups could not be assumed.  
The results showed significant differences of the mean scores between the groups A1/A2, t(16) = 
3.53, p = .003, d = 1.66, 95 CI [0.40, 1.60], B1/B2, t(16) = 2.70, p = .016, d = 1.27, 95 CI [0.24, 
1.99], and E1/E2, t(16) = 3.02, p = .008, d = 1.42, 95 CI [0.46, 2.65].  The differences between 
the other groups were not significant.   
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 We calculated a 4-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine whether the (DV) 
Scores was a function of the (IVs) Scenario, Rank, Pilot assessed, and Airline.  The mean, SD, 
and sample size (n) for each level of the IVs are shown in Table 4.   
 
The 4-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects for Rank [F(2, 72) = 12.36, p < 
.001, ω2 = .127] (ω2 indicates that approximately 12.7% of the variation in the Scores was 
attributable to differences between the three groups of assessor pairs [FO, CAP, and FE]), Pilot 
assessed [F(1, 72) = 10.24, p = .002, ω2 = .052], and Airline [F(1, 72) = 40.96, p < .001, ω2 = 
.223], yet not for Scenario.  However, we decided to keep the Scenario in the model due to its 
significant interactions with Rank [F(4, 72) = 2.58, p = .044, ω2 = .035] (Figure 3a) and Pilot 
assessed [F(2, 72) = 3.25, p = .045, ω2 = .025] (Figure 3b).  (Homogeneous variances between 
Table 4 
Sample Sizes (n), Means, and SD of the Scores in Relation to the IVs Rank, Pilot Assessed, 
Airline, and Scenario 
IV Levels of IV n Mean SD 
Rank FO 36 3.67 0.926 
 CAP 36 3.28 1.386 
 FE 36 2.56 1.132 
Pilot Assessed Captain 54 2.87 1.182 
First Officer 54 3.46 1.239 
Airline Airline A 54 3.76 0.889 
 Airline B 54 2.57 1.268 
Scenario Scenario 1 36 2.92 1.025 
 Scenario 2 36 3.28 1.233 
 Scenario 3 36 3.31 1.431 
Note. IV = Independent variable, SD = Standard Deviation, FO = First officer assessor 
(pair), CAP = Captain assessor (pair), FE = Flight examiner assessor (pair).   
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 the two airlines in terms of the scores could not be assumed due to the differences found in the 
dispersion measures and the significant result of the test for homogeneity of variance [Levene 
F(35, 72) = 2.37, p = .001].  However, a Box-Cox transformation revealed that there is no better 
transformation of the DV (λ = 1).  We deemed this the best model and build the findings on the 
original, non-transformed data.)  These interactions contributed to additional 14% of variance 
explained (r2Scenario included = .596; r
2
Scenario excluded = .456).  All other interactions were not 
significant.  Yet due to its central role, we provide interaction plots for Airline and Scenario 
(Figure 3d), Airline and Rank (Figure 3e), as well as Airline and Pilot assessed (Figure 3f).  For 
the sake of completeness, we also show the interaction of Rank and Pilot assessed (Figure 3c).   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Interactions of Rank and Scenario (3a), Scenario and Pilot assessed (3b), Rank and 
Pilot assessed (3c), Scenario and Airline (3d), Rank and Airline (3e), and Pilot assessed and 
Airline (3f).   
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  Post hoc contrasts were calculated to provide pairwise comparisons (all p-values were 
corrected according to Bonferroni).  The results indicated that the mean score (Table 4) provided 
to the first officer assessed was significantly higher than the mean score to the captain, p = .002, 
95 CI [.22, .96].  On average, the pairs of Airline A provided significantly higher scores than the 
pairs of Airline B, p < .001, 95 CI [.82, 1.55].  The mean score of the FO pairs was significantly 
higher than the mean score of the FE pairs, p < .001, 95 CI [.55, 1.67]; also the CAP pairs scored 
significantly higher than the FE pairs, p = .006, 95 CI [.17, 1.28]; however, no significant 
difference was found between the scoring of the FO and CAP pairs.  These findings were 
congruent with the correlation of the Scores and Rank [rs(108) = -.37, p<.001]: the higher the 
pairs’ rank (FE>CAP>FO), the lower the assessment scores provided.   
The critical reader might question the interpretation of main effects when the respective 
IVs are involved in significant interactions.  We calculated a 1-way ANOVA for each IV (in 
relation to the DV Scores), which showed identical significant results as in the more complex 
model (4-way ANOVA) outlined above: Rank [F(2, 105) = 8.46, p < .001], Pilot assessed [F(1, 
106) = 6.46, p = .012], Airline [F(1, 106) = 31.64, p < .001], whereas Scenario again was not 
significant.  The post hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) were also identical.   
Further Exploratory Analyses  
In the following, we outline further relevant and interesting findings pertaining to the 
demographics of the participants, the important issue of a spinning engine in S3, and an 
examination of the pairs’ pass-fail ratings.   
Demographics of the assessors.  The participants’ (N = 36) mean age, total flight hours, 
and years as CPL are shown in Table 5 and visualized in Figure 4, separately for each airline and 
rank.  Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare whether the assessors of Airline A 
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 and B significantly differed in terms of their demographic background.  Comparisons were made 
between all assessors (n = 18 per airline), as well as between each individual rank (FO, CAP, FE; 
n = 6 per rank and airline).  If equal variances could not be assumed (significant Levene’s test), 
the findings for equal variances not assumed were reported, which is subsequently marked with 
an asterisk (*).   
Table 5 
Mean and SD of the Age, Total Flight Hours, and Years as CPL for Each Rank and Airline 
 Rank Age (years) Total flight hours Years as CPL 
Airline A FO 30.67 (3.33) 4950.00 (2012.71) 11.67 (4.08) 
 CAP 45.33 (6.68) 15376.67 (6096.10) 24.17 (6.68) 
 FE 49.17 (6.21) 14250.00 (4906.22) 25.33 (5.92) 
 All assessors 41.72 (9.75) 11525.56 (6505.07) 20.39 (8.30) 
Airline B FO 26.50 (3.21) 3116.67 (2835.08) 6.00 (4.29) 
 CAP 31.33 (4.76) 4800.00 (1164.47) 9.83 (2.32) 
 FE 42.67 (9.07) 12050.00 (4289.41) 20.25 (8.35) 
 All assessors 33.50 (9.08) 6655.56 (4907.16) 12.03 (8.12) 
Note. Mean (SD).  SD = Standard Deviation, FO = First officer assessor (pair), CAP = 
Captain assessor (pair), FE = Flight examiner assessor (pair), CPL = Commercial pilot 
license (meaning: years as a commercial pilot).   
 
 The mean age of all assessors of Airline A (Table 5) was significantly higher than the 
mean age of the assessors of Airline B, t(34) = 2.62, p = .013, d = 0.87, 95 CI [1.84, 14.61].  The 
mean age of Airline A was also significantly higher than of Airline B in terms of the CAP 
assessors, t(10) = 4.18, p = .002, d = 2.41, 95 CI [6.54, 21.46].  In contrast, the mean age 
difference between Airline A and B was neither significant for the FE nor for the FO assessors.   
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Figure 4. The participants’ mean age, total flight hours, and years as CPL for each rank and 
airline.   
 
 The mean total flight hours of all assessors of Airline A (Table 5) was significantly 
higher than those of Airline B, t(34) = 2.54, p = .016, d = .85, 95 CI [966.88, 8773.12].  The 
mean total flight hours of Airline A was also significantly higher than those of Airline B in terms 
of the CAP assessors, t(5.36) = 4.17, p = .007*, d = 2.41, 95 CI [4194.38, 16958.96].  However, 
the difference of the mean total flight hours was neither significant in terms of the FE nor FO 
assessors.   
 The mean yeas as CPL of all assessors of Airline A (Table 5) was significantly higher 
than those of Airline B, t(34) = 3.06, p = .004, d = 1.02, 95 CI [2.80, 13.92].  The mean years as 
CPL of Airline A was also significantly higher than those of Airline B in terms of the CAP 
assessors, t(6.19) = 4.97, p = .002*, d = 2.87, 95 CI [7.33, 21.34], as well as the FO assessors, 
t(10) = 2.34, p = .041, d = 1.35, 95 CI [0.28, 11.05].  However, no significant difference of the 
mean years as CPL was found in terms of the FE assessors.   
The spinning engine in Scenario 3.  During the assessment of S3, some of the pairs 
noticed that an engine was still spinning when the crew ordered the passengers to evacuate the 
aircraft to this side.  (Evacuating the passengers into a spinning engine was neither planned nor 
scripted in the scenario.  It occurred during filming and was only noticed after the completion of 
the production.  The authors believe that the unplanned nature of this issue contributed to the 
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 authenticity of the scenario, which was the reason to not exclude S3 from the analysis.)  In the 
discussion after the assessment, some of the pairs noted that the issue of the spinning engine was 
crucial and had strongly decreased the scores provided to both pilots assessed.  We focused on 
S3 to provide an overview of the pairs who noticed the spinning engine or not, and analyzed the 
issue of the spinning engine in regards to the scores provided to the pilots.   
The spinning engine was noticed by 4 out of 18 assessor pairs: one FE pair of Airline A, 
whereas two FE and one FO pair of Airline B.  The FE pair of Airline A and FO pair of Airline 
B gave each pilot a score 2 for their performance in S3.  The other two FE pairs of Airline B 
scored the captain and first officer a 1.  All pairs who noticed the spinning engine failed both 
crew members.  There was a significant difference between the mean scores of the pairs that 
noticed (mean score 1.50) vs. did not notice (mean score 3.82) the spinning engine, t(34) = 5.47, 
p < .001, d = 2.19, 95 CI [1.46, 3.18] (n = 36; only including S3).   
Pass-fail rating.  The pass-fail ratings came about differently for the two airlines: Airline 
A followed their company’s fail-criterion, which resulted when the pilot was scored one rating of 
1 or three ratings of 2 on any of the six assessment categories.  In contrast, the pairs of Airline B 
could freely decide whether they passed or failed each pilot, due to not being given an 
assessment model.  It was worth comparing the pass-fail ratings independently of the scores.  An 
overview of the number of pass-fail ratings is given in Table 6, separately for each pilot assessed, 
scenario, and airline.   
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 Table 6 
Number of Pass-Fail Ratings for Each Airline, Scenario, and Pilot Assessed 
   Pilot assessed   
      Captain First officer Total 
Airline A Scenario 1 Fail 5 1 6 
  Pass 4 8 12 
 Scenario 2 Fail 2 0 2 
   Pass 7 9 16 
 Scenario 3 Fail 1 1 2 
  Pass 8 8 16 
 All scenarios Fail 8 2 10 
    Pass 19 25 44 
Airline B Scenario 1 Fail 8 3 11 
  Pass 1 6 7 
 Scenario 2 Fail 5 3 8 
   Pass 4 6 10 
 Scenario 3 Fail 5 5 10 
  Pass 4 4 8 
 All scenarios Fail 18 11 29 
   Pass 9 16 25 
 
 The analysis of the number of pass-fail ratings revealed differences between the two 
airlines.  Overall, the assessor pairs of Airline B failed the captain more often (18 times; Table 6) 
than the assessors of Airline A (8x).  The same applied to the first officer (11x vs. 2x).  In 
contrast, the assessors of Airline A passed both crewmembers more often (44x vs. 25x), which 
was also the case for each scenario assessed.   
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 The comparison of the pass-fail ratings of all scenarios (Table 6, column ‘total,’ rows ‘all 
scenarios’) showed a significant difference between the two airlines, p < .001 (Pearson Chi-
Square, N = 108).  The results indicate that the airline that was not given a model to assess 
performance (Airline B) was much stricter in their assessment and failed both pilots more often 
than the pairs that used an assessment model (Airline A).   
Discussion 
This study was designed to examine differences in the scoring between assessors who 
used (Airline A) versus did not use (Airline B) an assessment model to judge pilots’ 
performance.  The results showed that the pairs of Airline B scored lower and failed the pilots 
more often than the assessors of Airline A.  Furthermore, there was a larger spread of the scores 
in Airline B.  In contrast to the first officer assessed, the pairs of the two airlines differed more 
extensively in their judgments of the captain, who also received the lower scores.  It remains 
unclear whether this was due to poorer performance or, for instance, the higher level of 
responsibility associated with this role.   
 The present study is limited in its design due to a confound about whether the differences 
in the scoring are the result of the airlines involved or the use of an assessment model.  In order 
to address this possibly confounding effect, various variables have been controlled in terms of 
the participating pilots’ training and experience across the two airlines.  Future research in this 
area may incorporate a more rigorous design, involving highly identical conditions across 
participants and integrating a larger number of pilots who operate the same type of aircraft and 
work for the same airline.  This would standardize the amount of participants’ CRM and 
assessment training among equal ranks.  Allocating individual assessor-pilots to various groups 
that receive different treatments (e.g., not using a model, using Model A, using Model B, etc.) 
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 will allow examining if variation in assessors’ scoring is related to any particular treatment.  The 
present study is partly limited in this regard due to accessibility to, and availability of, a larger 
number of airline professionals who all operate the same type of aircraft for the same airline, and 
with an equal amount of training and experience.   
Rather than making a general statement of (inter-rater) reliability and validity 
(psychometrics), however, the authors express their concerns about the influence of an 
assessment model in the evaluation of pilot performance.  The number of participants may be 
limited in this effort, yet the scores (as outlined in Table 2) clearly indicate differences, even 
within groups of the same airline and rank.   
The critical reader might challenge whether differences in the scoring are the result of 
unequal levels of experience between Airline A and B.  However, this reasonable doubt can 
largely be dispelled by assessors’ similar demographic background.  Namely, the flight 
examiners of Airline A and B did not significantly differ in terms of their age, flight hours, and 
years as CPL.  The first officers solely differed in regards to their years as CPL.  Only the 
captain assessors of Airline A were older, had logged more flight hours, and held their CPL for 
more years than their colleagues of Airline B.   
However, it goes without saying that the experience of the participating pilots and their 
prior training cannot entirely be verified and validated for possible reasons of failure.  Both have 
to be inferred.  This too, however, was controlled in this study by thoroughly examining 
assessors’ demographic background and by providing equal assessor training to each assessor 
group and airline.  Yet pilots’ experience and exposure to training may always slightly vary, for 
instance due to working in and for different airlines throughout their careers, having operated 
different types of aircraft, and variation across company procedures.   
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 The training of the pilots may have slightly varied across the two airlines, yet all pilots, 
and notably the participating flight examiners, were highly experienced (Table 5).  They had 
been nominated by their respective airline to perform their duties as examiners, independently of 
the type of aircraft they operate, the routes they fly, the hard limits set on performance standards, 
or standardization of experience and training across airlines.  Differences in the very scoring of 
flight examiners between the two airlines and particularly within the same airline support the 
authors’ concerns.  Scores largely differ, namely the scores provided by the flight examiners.  In 
fact, no pilot (captain or first officer assessed) received one particular score across all flight 
examiner pairs (Table 2).  Flight examiners of Airline A and B differ in their scoring even when 
witnessing Scenario 3, which was identical for both airlines.   
All pairs who noticed the spinning engine in S3 provided low scores and failed both crew 
members.  However, it remains unclear why the spinning engine was not picked up by the other 
pairs and was observed by a larger number of pairs of Airline B.  A critical issue was only 
noticed by a small number of assessor pairs, and by an even smaller number of pairs who did use 
an assessment model and word pictures.  The use of a model apparently did not enhance 
assessors’ observation of safety-critical crew performance.  A critical observation resulted in 
substantial variation in assessors’ scoring.  This requires questioning whether an assessment 
model might better increase agreement among raters, if it directed assessors’ attention to critical 
pilot behavior.  Future research is required to examine whether the model used in the present 
study and other models are capable of supporting assessors’ discovering of critical performance 
issues.   
In accordance with behavioral-observation training (Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994), assessors 
have to be encouraged to watch and discuss scenarios in small sequences.  It was this technique 
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 that seemed to have enabled the pairs who noticed the spinning engine to discover hidden details.  
However, assessors hardly have unlimited time and the benefit of repeatedly watching the 
performance of pilots during their initial flight and recurrency training.  Moreover, assessments 
do not only depend on assessors’ observations, yet also on the way observations are evaluated 
and weighted (Borman, 1978).  Consequently, different interpretations of complex pilot 
performance may remain likely.   
When asked after the assessment of the three scenarios, the pairs of Airline A noted that 
the model and word pictures supported and matched what they referred to as their personal “gut 
feeling” about each pilot’s performance.  The pairs of Airline B pilots expressed their “gut 
feeling” too, despite not having used an assessment model.  However, the pairs of the two 
airlines largely arrived at different conclusions about performance.  The scoring not only differed 
between the pairs of Airline A and B, but also between pairs of the same airline and rank (Table 
2).  Rather than questioning the accuracy and adequacy of Airline A’s performance review, there 
is the need for qualitative examinations into assessors’ reasoning behind the scoring, particularly 
in regards to identical scores when using a model or not.  Studies have to further investigate why 
scores differ, particularly if assessors all use the same assessment model and word pictures.   
 The confound in the design of this study prevents the generalization of the results to the 
larger population.  However, the present investigation into a highly representative sample of 
airline professionals has outlined the importance of examining the influence of an assessment 
model when aspiring to better understand variation in the scoring of airline pilot performance.   
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